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Abstract
We study markets of indivisible items in which
price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not ex-
ist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead
we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed
as a game, where players bid for items, and where
the highest bidder on an item wins it and pays his
bid. We first observe that pure Nash-equilibria of
this game excatly correspond to price-based equili-
biria (and thus need not exist), but that mixed-
Nash equilibria always do exist, and we analyze
their structure in several simple cases where no
price-based equilibrium exists. We also undertake
an analysis of the welfare properties of these equi-
libria showing that while pure equilibria are always
perfectly efficient (“first welfare theorem”), mixed
equilibria need not be, and we provide upper and
lower bounds on their amount of inefficiency.
∗Google, Tel Aviv.
†Google, Tel Aviv, and the School of Computer science,
Tel Aviv University. This research was supported in part
by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF), by a
grant from United States-Israel Binational Science Founda-
tion (BSF). Email:haimk@cs.tau.ac.il.
‡School of Computer science, Tel Aviv University.
Email:mansour@cs.tau.ac.il. This research was supported in
part by a grant from the the Science Foundation (ISF), by a
grant from United States-Israel Binational Science Founda-
tion (BSF), by a grant from the Israeli Ministry of Science
(MoS), and by the Google Inter-university center for Elec-
tronic Markets and Auctions.
§School of Computer Science and Engineering, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. Supported by a grant from the
Israeli Science Foundation (ISF), and by the Google Inter-
university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The basic question that Economics deals with is
how to “best” allocate scarce resources. The basic
answer is that trade can improve everyone’s welfare,
and will lead to a market equilibrium: a vector of
resource prices that “clear the market” and lead to
an efficient allocation. Indeed, Arrow and Debreu
[1] and much further work shows that such market
equilibria exist in general settings.
Or do they...? An underlying assumption for the
existence of price-equilibria is always some notion
of “convexity”. While some may feel comfortable
with the restriction to “convex economies”, mar-
kets of discrete items – arguably the main object
of study in computerized markets and auctions –
are only rarely “convex” and indeed in most cases
do not have any price-based equilibria. What can
we predict to happen in such markets? Will these
outcomes be efficient in any sense? In this paper
we approach this questions by viewing the market
as a game, and studying its Nash-equilibria.
1.2 Our Model
To focus on the basic issue of lack of price-based
equilibria, our model does not address informa-
tional issues, assumes a single seller, and does not
assume any budget constraints.
Our seller is selling m heterogeneous indivisible
items to n buyers who are competing for them.
Each buyer i has a valuation function vi specifying
his value for each subset of the items. I.e. for a sub-
set S of the items vi(S) specifies the value for that
buyer if he gets exactly this subset of the items, ex-
pressed in some currency unit (i.e., the buyers are
quasi-linear). We will assume free disposal, i.e.,
that the vi’s are monotonically non-decreasing, but
nothing beyond that.
The usual notion of price-based equilibrium in
this model is called a Walrasian equilibrium: a set
of item prices p1 . . . pm and a partition S1 . . . Sn of
the m items among the n buyers such that each
buyer gets his “demand” under these prices, i.e.,
Si ∈ argmaxS(vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj). When such equi-
libria exist they maximize social welfare,
∑
i vi(Si),
but unfortunately it is known that they only rarely
exist – exactly when the associated integer program
has no integrality gap (see [3] for a survey).
We will consider this market situation as a game
where each player1 i announcesm offers bi1, . . . bim,
with the interpretation that bij is player i’s bid
of item j. After the offers are made, m indepen-
dent first price auctions are being made. That
is the utility of each bidder i is given by ui(b) =
vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
bij where S1 . . . Sn are a partition of
the m items with the property that each item went
to a highest bidder on it. Some care is needed in the
case of ties – two (or more) bidders i 6= i′ that place
the highest bid bij = bi′j for some item j. In this
case a tie breaking rule is needed to complete the
specification of the allocation and thus of the game.
Importantly, we view this as a game with complete
information, so each player knows the (combinato-
rial) valuation function of each other player.
1.3 Pure Nash Equilibrium
Our first observation is that the pure equilibria of
this game capture exactly the Walrasian equilibria
of the market. This justifies our point of view that
when we later allow mixed-Nash equilibria as well,
we are in fact strictly generalizing the notion of
price-equilibria.
Theorem: Fix a profile of valuations. Walrasian
equilibria of the associated market are in 1-1 corre-
spondence with pure Nash equilibria of the associ-
ated game. This holds in the exact sense for some
tie-breaking rule, and holds in the sense of limits of
ǫ-Nash equilibria for all ties-breaking rules.
A profile of strategies (bids) in the game is called
a “limit of ǫ-Nash equilibria” if for every ǫ > 0 there
1We use interchangeably the terms: player, bidder and
buyer, and all three have the same meaning.
exists a sequence of ǫ-Nash equilibria that approach
it.
Let us demonstrate this theorem with a trivial
example: a single item on sale and two bidders who
have values of 1 and 2 respectively for it. A Wal-
rasian equilibrium can fix the item’s price p any-
where between 1 and 2, at which point only the
second bidder desires it and the market clears. In
the associated game (with any tie breaking rule), a
bid p for the first player and bid p+ǫ for the second
player will be an ǫ-Nash-equilibrium. In the special
case that the tie breaking rule gives priority to the
second bidder, an exact pure-Nash equilibrium will
have both bidders bidding p on the item.
This theorem is somewhat counter intuitive as
strategic (non-price-taking) buyers in markets may
improve their utility by strategically “reducing de-
mand”. Yet, in our setting strategic buyers still
reach the basic non-strategic price-equilibrium.
As an immediate corollary of the fact that a Wal-
rasian equilibrium optimizes social welfare (“The
first welfare theorem”), we get the same optimality
in our game setting:
Corollary – A “First Welfare Theorem” For
every profile of valuations and every tie-breaking
rule, every pure Nash equilibrium of the game (in-
cluding a limit of ǫ-equilibria) optimizes social wel-
fare. In other words, the price of anarchy of pure
Nash equilibria is trivial.
1.4 Mixed Nash Equilibria
As mentioned above, since Walrasian equilibria
only rarely exists, so do only rarely exist pure Nash
equilibria in our games. So it is quite natural to
consider also the standard generalization, Mixed-
Nash equilibria of our market games. The issue of
existence of such mixed Nash equilibria is not triv-
ial in our setting as buyers have a continuum of
strategies and discontinuous utilities so Nash’s the-
orem does not apply. Nevertheless, there has been a
significant amount of economic work on these types
of settings and a theorem of Simon and Zame [8]
provides at least a partial general positive answer:
Corollary (to a theorem of [8]): For every profile of
valuations, there exists some (mixed) tie-breaking
rule such that the game has a mixed-Nash equilib-
rium.
2
It seems that, like in the case of pure equilibria,
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium should exist for all tie break-
ing rules, but we have not been able to establish
this.
Once existence is established, we turn our atten-
tion towards analyzing what these mixed equilibria
look like. We start with the two basic examples
that are well known not to have a price equilibria:
Example – Complements and Substitutes
Bidders: In this example there are two items and
two bidders. The first bidder (“OR bidder”) views
the two items as perfect substitutes and has value
of vor for either one of them (but is not interested in
getting both). The second bidder (“AND bidder”)
views them as complements and values the bundle
of both of them at vand (but is not interested in
either of them separately). It is not difficult to see
that when vand < 2vor no pure equilibrium exists,
however we find specific distributions F and G for
the bids of the players that are in mixed-Nash equi-
librium.
Example – Triangle: In this example there are
three items and three players. Each of the players is
interested in a specific pair of items, and has value
1 for that pair, and 0 for any single item, or any
other pair. A pure Nash equilibrium does not exist,
but we show that the following is a mixed-Nash
equilibrium: each player picks a bid x uniformly at
random in the range [0, 1/2] and bids this number
on each of the items. Interestingly the expected
utility of each player is zero. We generalize the
analysis to the case of single minded players, each
desiring a set of size k, each item is desired by d
players, and no two players’ sets intersect in at most
a single item.
We generalize our analysis to more general ex-
amples of these veins. In particular, these provide
examples where the mixed-Nash equilibrium is not
optimal in terms of maximizing social welfare and
in fact is far from being so.
Corollary – A “First Non-Welfare Theo-
rem”: There are profiles of valuations where a
mixed-Nash equilibrium does not maximize social
welfare. There are examples where pure equilib-
ria (that maximize social welfare) exist and yet
a mixed Nash equilibrium achieves only O(1
√
m)
fraction of social welfare (i.e., “price of anarchy” is
Ω(
√
m)). There exist examples where all mixed-
Nash equilibria achieve at most O(
√
(logm)/m)
fraction of social welfare (i.e., “price of stability”
is Ω(
√
m/(logm))).
At this point it is quite natural to ask how much
efficiency can be lost, in general, as well for inter-
esting subclasses of valuations, which we answer as
follows.
Theorem – An “Approximate First Welfare
Theorem”: For every profile of valuations, every
tie-breaking rule, and every mixed-Nash equilib-
rium of the game we have that the expected social
welfare obtained at the equilibrium is at least 1/α
(the “price of anarchy”) times the optimal social
welfare, where
1. α ≤ 2β if all valuations β-fractionally subad-
ditive. (The case β = 1 correponds to frac-
tionally subadditive valuations, also known as
XOS valuations. They include the set of sub-
modular valuations.)
2. α = O(logm) if all valuations are sub-additive.
3. α = O(m), in general.
These bounds apply also to correlated-Nash equi-
libria and even to coarse-correlated equilibria.
A related PoA result is that of [2] which derive
PoA for β-fractionally sub-additive bidders in a sec-
ond price simultaneous auction under the assump-
tion of “conservative bidding.” In this work we use
the first price (rather than the second price) and do
not make any assumption regarding the bidding.
Finally we extend these results also to a Bayesian
setting where players have only partial informa-
tion on the valuations of the other players. We
show that for any prior distribution on the val-
uations and in every Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
where each player bids only based on his own val-
uation (and the knowledge of the prior), the aver-
age social welfare is lower by at most α = O(mn)
than the optimal social welfare achieved with full
shared knowledge and cooperation of the players.
For a prior which is a product distribution over
valuations which are β-fractionally sub-additive we
show that α = 4β, which implies a bound of 4 for
sub-modular valuations and a bound of O(logm)for
sub-additive valuations. Our proof methodology
for this setting is similar to that of [2].
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1.5 Open Problems and Future
Work
We consider our work as a first step in the sys-
tematic study of notions of equilibrium in markets
where price equilibria do not exist. Our own work
focused on the mixed-Nash equilibrium, its exis-
tence and form, and its welfare properties. It is
certainly natural to consider other properties of
such equilibria such as their revenue or invariants
over the set of equilibria. One may also naturally
study other notions of equilibrium such as those
corresponding outcomes of natural dynamics (e.g.
coarse correlated equilibria which are the outcome
of regret minimization dynamics). It is also natural
to consider richer models of markets (e.g. two-sided
ones, non-quasi-linear ones, or ones with partial in-
formation).
Even within the modest scope of this paper, there
are several remaining open questions: the existence
of mixed-Nash equilibrium under any tie-breaking
rule; the characterization of all equilibria for the
simple games we studied; and closing the various
gaps in our price of anarchy and price of stability
results.
2 Model
We have a set M of m heterogeneous indivisible
items for sale to a set N of n bidders. Each bidder
i has a valuation function vi where for a set of items
S ⊆M , vi(S) is his value for receiving the set S of
items. We will not make any assumptions on the
vi’s except that they are monotone non decreasing
(free disposal) and that vi(∅) = 0. We assume that
the utility of the bidders is quasi-linear, namely, if
bidder i gets subset Si and pays pi then ui(Si, pi) =
vi(Si)− pi.
We will consider this market situation as a game
where the items are sold in simultaneous first price
auctions. Each bidder i ∈ N places a bid bij on
each each item j ∈ M , and the highest bidder on
each item gets the item and pays his bid on the
item. We view this as a game with complete in-
formation. The utility of each bidder i is given by
ui(b) = vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
bij where S1...Sn are a par-
tition of the m items with the property that each
item went to the bidder that gave the highest bid
for it.
Some care is required in cases of ties, i.e., if for
some bidders i 6= i′ and an item j ∈ M we have
that bij = bi′j are both highest bids for item j. In
these cases the previous definition does not com-
pletely specify the allocation, and to complete the
definition of the game we must specify a tie break-
ing rule that chooses among the valid allocations.
(I.e. specifies the allocation S1, . . . , Sn as a function
of the bids.) In general we allow any tie breaking
rule, a rule that may depend arbitrarily on all the
bids. Even more, we allow randomized (mixed) tie
breaking rules in which some distribution over de-
terministic tie breaking rules is chosen. We will call
any game of this family (i.e.,with any tie breaking
rule) a “first price simultaneous auction game” (for
a given profile of valuations).
3 Pure Nash Equilibrium
The usual analysis of this scenario considers a mar-
ket situation and a price-based equilibrium:
Definition 3.1 A partition of the items S1...Sn
and a non-negative vector of prices p1...pm are
called a Walrasian equilibrium if for every i we have
that Si ∈ argmaxS(vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pi).
We consider bidders participating in a simultane-
ous first price auction game, with some tie breaking
rule.
Our first observation is that pure equilibria of a
first price simultaneous auction game correspond to
Walrasian equilibiria of the market. In particular
the price of anarchy of pure equilibria is 1.
Proposition 3.2 1. A profile of valuation func-
tions v1...vn admits a Walrasian equilibrium
with given prices and allocation if and only if
the first price simultaneous auction game for
these valuations has a pure Nash equilibrium
for some tie breaking rule with these winning
prices and allocation.
2. Every pure Nash equilibrium of a first price si-
multaneous auction game achieves optimal so-
cial welfare.
Proof: Let S1, . . . , Sn and p1, . . . , pm be a Wal-
rasian equilibrium. Consider the bids where bij =
pj for all j and let the game break ties according
to S1...Sn. Why are these bids a pure equilibrium
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of this game? Since we are in a Walrasian equilib-
rium, each player gets a best set for him under the
prices pj . In the game, given the bids of the other
players, he can never win any item for strictly less
than pj , whatever his bid, and he does wins the
items in Si for price pj exactly, so his current bid
is a best response to the others2.
Now fix a pure Nash equilibrium of the game
with a given tie breaking rule. Let S1, . . . , Sn the
allocation specified by the tie breaking rule, and
let pj = maxi bij for all j. We claim that this is a
Walrasian equilibrium. Suppose by way of contra-
diction that some player i strictly prefers another
bundle T under these prices. This contradicts the
original bid of i was a best reply since the devia-
tion bidding bij = pj + ǫ for j ∈ T and bij = 0 for
j 6∈ T would give player i the utility from T (minus
some ǫ’s) which would be more than he currently
gets from Si – a contradiction.
The allocation obtained by the game, is itself the
allocation in a Walrasian equilibrium, and thus by
the First Welfare Theorem is a social-welfare max-
imizing allocation.
Two short-comings of this proposition are ob-
vious: first is the delicate dependence on tie-
breaking: we get a Nash equilibrium only for some,
carefully chosen, tie breaking rule. In the next sec-
tion we will show that this is un-avoidable using the
usual definitions, but that it is not a “real” prob-
lem: specifically we show that for any tie-breaking
rule we get arbitrarily close to an equilibrium.
The second short-coming is more serious: it is
well known that Walrasian equilibria exist only for
restricted classes of valuation profiles3. In the gen-
eral case, there is no pure equilibrium and thus the
result on the price of anarchy is void. In particular,
the result does not extend to mixed Nash equilibria
and in fact it is not even clear whether such mixed
equilibria exist at all since Nash’s theorem does not
apply due to the non-compactness of the space of
mixed strategies. This will be the subject of the
2The reader may dislike the fact that the bids of loosing
players seem artificially high and indeed may be in weakly
dominated strategies. This however is unavoidable since,
as we will see in the next section, counter-intuitively some-
times there are no pure equilibria in un-dominated strate-
gies. What can be said is that minimal Walrasian equilibria
correspond to pure equilibria of the game with strategies
that are limits of un-dominated strategies.
3When all valuations are “substitutes”.
the following sections.
3.1 Tie Breaking and Limits of ǫ-
Equilibria
This subsection shows that the quantification to
some tie-breaking rule in the previous theorem is
unavoidable. Nevertheless we argue that it is really
just a technical issue since we can show that for ev-
ery tie breaking rule there is a limit of ǫ-equilibria.
A first price auction with the wrong tie
breaking rule
Consider the full information game describing a
first price auction of a single item between Alice,
who has a value of 1 for the item, and Bob who val-
ues it at 2, where the bids, x for Alice and y for Bob,
are allowed to be, say, in the range [0, 10]. The full
information game specifying this auction is defined
by uA(x, y) = 0 for x < y and uA(x, y) = 1 − x
for x > y, and uB(x, y) = 2 − y for x < y and
uB(x, y) = 0 for x > y. Now comes our main point:
how would we define what happens in case of ties?
It turns out that formally this “detail” determines
whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists.
Let us first consider the case where ties are bro-
ken in favor of Bob, i.e., uB(x, y) = 2− y for x = y
and uA(x, y) = 0 for x = y. In this case one may
verify that x = 1, y = 1 is a pure Nash equilibrium4.
Now let us look at the case that ties are broken in
favor of Alice, i.e uA(x, y) = 1−x and uB(x, y) = 0
for x = y. In this case no pure Nash equilibrium
exists: first no x 6= y can be an equilibrium since
the winner can always reduce his bid by ǫ and still
win, then if x = y > 1 then Alice would rather bid
x = 0, while if x = y < 2 then Bob wants to deviate
to y + ǫ and to win, contradiction.
This lack of pure Nash equilibrium doesn’t seem
to capture the essence of this game, as in some
informal sense, the ”correct” pure equilibrium is
(x = 1, y = 1 + ǫ) (as well as (x = 1 − ǫ, y = 1)),
with Bob winning and paying 1 + ǫ (1). Indeed
these are ǫ-equilibria of the game. Alternatively, if
4The bid x = 1 is weakly dominated for Alice. Surpris-
ingly, however, there is no pure equilibrium in un-dominated
strategies: suppose that some y is at equilibrium with an un-
dominated strategy x < 1. If yge1 then reducing y to y = x
would still make Bob win, but at a lower price. However, if
y < 1 too, then the loser can win by bidding just above the
current winner – contradiction.
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we discretize the auction in any way allowing some
minimal ǫ precision then bids close to 1 with min-
imal gap would be a pure Nash equilibrium of the
discrete game. We would like to formally capture
this property: that x = 1, y = 1 is arbitrarily close
to an equilibrium.
Limits of ǫ-Equilibria
We will become quite abstract at this point and
consider general games with (finitely many) n play-
ers whose strategy sets may be infinite. In order to
discuss closeness we will assume that the pure strat-
egy set Xi of each player i has a metric di on it.
In applications we simply consider the Euclidean
distance.
Definition 3.3 (x1...xn) is called a limit (pure)
equilibrium of a game (u1...un) if it is the limit
of ǫ-equilibria of the game, for every ǫ > 0.
Thus in the example of the first price auction,
(1, 1) is a limit equilibrium, since for every ǫ > 0,
(1, 1 + ǫ) is an ǫ-equilibrium. Note that if all the
ui’s are continuous at the point (x1...xn) then it
is a limit equilibrium only if it is actually a pure
Nash equilibrium. This, in particular, happens ev-
erywhere if all strategy spaces are discrete.
We are now ready to state a version of the pre-
vious proposition that is robust to the tie breaking
rule:
Proposition 3.4 1. For every first price simul-
taneous auction game with any tie breaking
rule, a profile of valuation functions v1...vn ad-
mits a Walrasian equilibrium with given prices
and allocation if and only if the game has
a limit Nash equilibrium for these valuations
with these winning prices and allocation.
2. Every limit Nash equilibrium of a first price si-
multaneous auction game achieves optimal so-
cial welfare.
Proof: Let S1...Sn and p1...pm be a Walrasian
equilibrium. Consider the bids where bij = pj + ǫ
for all j ∈ Si and bij = pj for all j 6∈ Si. Why are
these bids an mǫ-equilibrium of this game? Since
we are in a Walrasian equilibrium, each player gets
a best set for him under the prices pj . In the game,
given the bids of the other players, he can never win
any item for strictly less than pj , whatever his bid,
and player i does win each item j in Si for price
pj + ǫ, so his current bid is a best response to the
others up to an additive ǫ for each item he wins.
Now fix a limit Nash equilibrium (bij) of the
game with some tie breaking rule and let (b′ij) be an
ǫ-equilibrium of the game with |bij − b′ij | ≤ ǫ for all
i, j and with no ties; let S1...Sn the allocation im-
plied; and let pj = maxi bij for all j. We claim
that this is an mǫ-Walrasian equilibrium. Sup-
pose by way of contradiction that for some player
i and some bundle T 6= Si, vi(T ) −
∑
j∈T pj >
vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
pj +mǫ. This would contradict the
original bid of i being an ǫ-best reply since the de-
viation bidding bij = pj + ǫ for j ∈ T and bij = 0
for j 6∈ T would give player i the utility from T up
to mǫ which would be more than he currently gets
from Si – a contradiction.
Now let ǫ approach zero and look at the sequence
of price vectors ~p and sequence of allocations ob-
tained as (b′ij) approach (bij). The sequence of
price vectors converges to a fixed price vector (since
they are a continuous function of the bids). Since
there are only a finite number of different alloca-
tions, one of them appears infinitely often in the
sequence. It is now easy to verify that this allo-
cation with the limit price vector are a Walrasian
equilibrium.
4 General Existence of Mixed
Nash Equilibrium
In this section we ask whether such a game need al-
ways even have a mixed-Nash equilibrium. This is
not a corollary of Nash’s theorem due to the contin-
uum of strategies and discontinuity of the utilities,
and indeed even zero-sum two-player games with
[0, 1] as the set of pure strategies of each player may
fail to have any mixed-Nash equilibrium or even
an ǫ-equilibrium5. There is some economic litera-
ture about the existence of equilibiria in such games
(starting e.g. with [7, 4]), and a theorem of Simon
and Zame [8], implies that for some (randomized)
tie breaking rule, a mixed-Nash equilibrium exists.
The main example of their (more general) theorem
is the following (cf. page 864):
5A well known example is having highest bidder win, as
long as his bid is strictly less than 1, in which case he looses
(with ties being ties).
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Suppose we are given strategy spaces Si, a dense
subset S∗ of S = S1×· · ·×Sn, and a bounded con-
tinuous function ϕ : S∗ → ℜn. Let Cϕ : S → ℜn
be the correspondence whose graph is the closure of
the graph of ϕ, and define Qϕ(s) to be the convex
hull of Cϕ(s) for each s ∈ S. We call the correspon-
dence Qϕ the convex completion of ϕ. These are
Simon and Zame’s motivating example of “games
with an endogenous sharing rule”, and their main
theorem is that these have a “solution”: a pair
(q, α), where q is a “sharing rule”, a Borel mea-
surable selection from the payoff correspondence Q
and α = (α1, . . . , αn) is a profile of mixed strate-
gies with the property that each player’s action is a
best response to the actions of other players, when
utilities are according to the sharing rule q.
Now to how this applies in our setting: S∗ will
be the set of bids with no ties, i.e., where for all
j and all i 6= i′ we have that bij 6= bi′j , which
is clearly dense (since bids with ties have measure
zero). Here ϕ is simply the vector of utilities of the
players from the chosen allocation which is fully
determined and continuous in S∗ – when there are
no ties. For b 6∈ S∗, we have that Cϕ(~b) is the set
of utility vectors obtained from all possible deter-
ministic tie-breaking rules at ~b (each of which may
be obtained as a limit of bids with no ties), and
Qϕ is the set of mixtures (randomizations) over
these. The solution thus provides a randomized
tie-breaking rule q and mixed strategies that are
a mixed-Nash equilibrium for the game with this
tie-breaking rule. So we get:
Corollary 4.1 The first price simultaneous auc-
tion game for any profile of valuations has a mixed-
Nash equilibrium for some randomized tie-breaking
rule.
We suspect that the tie-breaking rule is not that
significant and that mixed ǫ-Nash-equilibria (or
maybe even exact Nash-equilibria) actually exist
for every tie-breaking rule, similarly to the case of
pure equilibria in this paper, or as in the somewhat
related setting of [6] where an “invariance” in the
tie-breaking rule holds.
5 Mixed-Nash Equilibria: Ex-
amples
In this section we study some of the simplest ex-
amples of markets in our setting that do not have
a Walresian equilibrium.
5.1 The AND-OR Game
We have two players an AND player and OR player.
The AND player has a value of 1 if he gets all the
items in M , and the OR player has a value of v if
he gets any item in M . Formally, vand(M) = 1 and
for S 6= M we have vand(S) = 0, also, vor(T ) = v
for T 6= ∅ and vor(∅) = 0.
When v ≤ 1/m there is a Walresian equilib-
rium with a price of v per item. By Proposition
3.2 this implies a pure Nash Equilibrium in which
both players bid v on each item, and the AND player
wins all the items. Therefore, the interesting case
is when v > 1/m. It is easy to verify that in this
case is no Walresian equilibrium. We start with the
case that |M | = 2 and later extend it to the case
of arbitrary size. Here is a mixed Nash equilibrium
for two items.
• The AND player bids (y, y) where 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/2
according to cumulative distribution F (y) =
(v − 1/2)/(v− y) (where F (y) = Pr[bid ≤ y]).
In particular, There is an atom at 0: Pr[y =
0] = 1− 1/(2v).
• The OR player bids (x, 0) with probability 1/2
and (0, x) with probability 1/2, where 0 ≤ x ≤
1/2 is distributed according to cumulative dis-
tribution G(x) = x/(1− x).
Note that since the OR player does not have
any mass points in his distribution, the equilibrium
would apply to any tie breaking rule.
We start by defining a restricted AND-OR game,
where the AND player must bid the same value on
both items, and show that the above strategies are
a mixed Nash equilibrium for it.
Claim 5.1 Having the AND player bid using F and
the OR player bid using G is a mixed Nash equilib-
rium of the restricted AND-OR game for two items.
Proof: Let us compute the expected utility of the
AND player from some pure bid (y, y). The AND
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player wins one item for sure, and wins the second
item too if y > x, i.e., with probability G(y). If he
wins a single item he pays y, and he wins both items
he pays 2y. His expected utility is thus G(y)(1 −
y) − y = 0 for any 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/2 (and is certainly
negative for y > 1/2). Thus any 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/2 is a
best-response to the OR player.
Let us compute the expected utility of the OR
player from the pure bid (0, x) (or equivalently
(x, 0)). The OR player wins an item if x > y, i.e.,
with probability F (x), in which case he pays x, for
a total utility of (v − x) · F (x) = v − 1/2, for every
0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 (and x > 1/2 certainly gives less util-
ity). Thus any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 is a best-response to
the AND player.
Next we generalize the proof to the unrestricted
setting.
Theorem 5.2 Having the AND player bid using F
and the OR player bid using G is a mixed Nash equi-
librium of the AND-OR game for two items.
Proof: We first show that if the AND player plays
the mixed strategy F then G is a best response for
the OR player. This holds since when the AND
player is playing F , then all its bids are of the form
(y, y) for some y ∈ [0, , 1/2]. Any bid (x1, x2) of the
OR player, with x1 ≤ x2, is dominated by (0, x2),
since the AND player is restricted to bidding (y, y).
Therefore, G is a best response for the OR player.
We now need to show that if the OR player plays
the mixed strategy G then F is a best response for
the AND player.
Let Q(x, y) be the cumulative probability of the
OR player, i.e.,
Q(x, y) = Pr[bid1 < x, bid2 < y] =
x
2(1− x)+
y
2(1− y) .
for x, y ∈ [0, 12 ]. The AND utility function, given
its distribution P , is:
UAND = E(x,y)∼P [uand(x, y)],
where
uand(x, y) = 1 ·Q(x, y)− (xQ(x, 1) + yQ(1, y))
We show that for any x, y ∈ [0, 12 ] we have
uand(x, y) = 0. This follows since,
uand(x, y) = 1 ·Q(x, y)− (xQ(x, 1) + yQ(1, y))
=
(
x
2(1− x) +
y
2(1− y)
)
− x
(
x
2(1− x) +
1
2
)
−y
(
1
2
+
y
2(1− y)
)
= (1 − x) x
2(1− x) + (1− y)
y
2(1− y) −
x
2
− y
2
= 0,
which completes the proof.
We now extend the result to the AND-OR game
with m items. The AND player selects y using the
cumulative probability distribution F (y) =
v− 1
m
v−y
for y ∈ [0, 1/m], and bids y on all the items. The
OR player selects x using the cumulative probabil-
ity distribution G(x) = (m−1)x(1−x) , where x ∈ [0, 1/m],
and an i uniformly from M , and bids x on item i
and zero on all the other items.
Theorem 5.3 Having the AND player bid using F
and the OR player with G is a mixed Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof: Let Q(x), for x ∈ [0, 1/m]m be the cumula-
tive probability distribution of the bids of the OR
player. Given that the OR player bids using G it
follows that
Q(x) = Pr[∀i bidi < xi] =
m∑
i=1
xi
1− xi
(
m− 1
m
)
for x ∈ [0, 1m ]m. Let P denote the cumulative prob-
ability distribution of the bids of the AND player.
Then the utility of the AND player is:
UAND = Ex∼P [uand(x)],
where
uand(x) = 1 ·Q(x) −
m∑
i=1
xiQ(xi, (1/m)−i) .
We show that for any x ∈ [0, 1m ]m we have
uand(x) = 0.
uand(x) = 1 ·Q(x)−
(
k∑
i=1
xiQ(xi, (1/m)−i)
)
=
m∑
i=1
xi
1− xi
(
m− 1
m
)
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−
m∑
i=1
xi
(
xi
1− xi
(
m− 1
m
)
+ (m− 1) 1
m
)
=
m∑
i=1
(1− xi) xi
1− xi
(
m− 1
m
)
−
(
m∑
i=1
xi
m− 1
m
)
= 0.
This implies that the mixed strategy of the AND
player defined by F , is a best response to the mixed
strategy of the OR player defined by G. We now
show that the mixed strategy of the OR player de-
fined by G, is a best response to the mixed strategy
of the AND player defined by F .
Recall that P (x), for x ∈ [0, 1/m]m is the cu-
mulative probability distribution of the bids of the
AND player, and by the definition of the AND
player it equals to
P (x) = Pr[∀i bidi < xi] =
v − 1m
v −mini{xi} .
(Note that, as it should be, under P the support is
the set of all identical bids, i.e., ∀i bidi = x. The
probability under P of having a vector z ≤ x is
v− 1
m
v−x .)
The utility function of the OR player is:
UOR = Ex∼Q[uor(x)],
where
uor(x) = v · e(x) −
(
m∑
i=1
xiP (xi, (1/m)−i)
)
.
where e(x) = PrP [∃i such that Xi < xi].
We obtain that for any x ∈ [0, 1m ] and i ∈ [1,m]
uor(xi = x, x−i = 0) = v − 1m since
uor(xi = x, x−i = 0) =
v − (1/m)
v − x (v − x) = v −
1
m
Furthermore, for any x ∈ [0, 1m ]m we have uor(x) ≤
uor(y), where y keeps only the maximal entry in x
and zeros the rest. This follows since given P , the
probability of winning under x and y is identical.
Clearly the payments under y are at most those
under x (since all the bids in x are at least the bids
in y). We conclude that the OR player’s strategy is
a best response to the AND player’s strategy, and
this completes the proof.
5.2 The Triangle Game
We start with a simple case of three single minded
bidders and three items, where each bidder wants
a different set of two items, and has a value of one
for this set.
Consider symmetric strategies in which each
player bids the same for the pair of items it wants,
namely each player draws their bid x from the same
distribution whose cumulative distribution function
is F (x). Assuming F (x) has no atoms then the util-
ity of each player is
(1−2x)F 2(x)−2xF (x)(1−F (x)) = F 2(x)−2xF (x)
Theorem 5.4 If each player draws an x from
F (x) = 2x, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, and bids x on
both items, then it is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose two of the players play according
to F (x) and consider the best response of the third
player. For any value 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 if the third
player bids (x, x), his utility is zero. On the other
hand, if it bids y for one item and z for the other
then its utility is F (y)F (z) · 1 − yF (y) − zF (z) =
−2(y − z)2 ≤ 0. Finally, bidding any number
strictly above 1/2 is dominated by bidding 1/2.
Consider now a generalization of this game where
each player is single minded and is interested only
in a particular set of k items for which its utility is
1. We also make the following assumptions.
1. Exactly d agents are interested in each item.
2. For any two bidders i 6= i′, we have |Si∩Si′ | ≤
1. (This implies that if we fix a player i and
consider its set Si of k items. The other (d−1)k
players who are also interested in these k items
are all different.)
Assume each player i draws the same bid for all
items in its set Si from the CDF G(x). If G(x)
satisfies the equation
G(d−1)k(x)− kxGd−1(x) = 0 (1)
for all x then the utility of a player is zero for every
bid x.
One can easily verify that the function
G(x) = (kx)
1
(d−1)(k−1) ,
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satisfies Equation (1) for all x. So G(x) =
(kx)
1
(d−1)(k−1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1k , forms an equilibrium for
the restricted game, where in the restricted game a
player has to bid the same bid on all the items in
his set. The following shows that even if we do not
restrict the players to bid the same then G(x) is an
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.5 If all players draw a bid for all k
items that they want from G(x) = (kx)
1
(d−1)(k−1) ,
0 ≤ x ≤ 1k , then it is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose all the players but one play ac-
cording to G(x) and consider the best response of
the first player. Suppose its bid is xj for the jth
item in Si. Then its utility is
Πkj=1(kxj)
1
(k−1) −
k∑
j=1
xj(kxj)
1
(k−1) .
We claim that this utility is non-positive for every
set of bids x1, . . . , xk. Indeed this follows since
k
k
k−1
k∏
j=1
x
1
(k−1)
j ≤ k
1
k−1
k∑
j=1
x
k
(k−1)
j
by the inequality of arithmetic and geometric
means:
k
√∏
x
k
k−1
i =
k∏
j=1
x
1
(k−1)
j ≤
1
k
k∑
j=1
x
k
(k−1)
j .
6 Inefficiency of Mixed Equi-
libria
In this section we use our analysis of the examples
given in the previous section to construct examples
where there are large gaps between the efficiency
obtained in a mixed-Nash equilibrium and the op-
timal efficiency.
We first analyze the AND-OR game with m
items, where v ≥ 1/m, and hence there is no pure
Nash equilibrium. We will analyze the following
parameters: value of the OR player is v = 1/
√
m
and the value of the AND player is 1.
Theorem 6.1 There is a mixed Nash equilibrium
in the AND-OR game with the parameters above
whose social welfare is at most 2/
√
m. I.e. for this
game we have PoA ≥ √m/2.
Proof: For the PoA consider the equilibrium of
Section 5.1. Assume that the value of the OR
player is v = 1/
√
m and the value of the AND
player is 1. This implies that the optimal social wel-
fare is 1. The probability that the AND player bids
x = 0 is v−1/mv−x = 1− 1/
√
m. Therefore with prob-
ability at least 1−1/√m the OR player wins. This
implies that the social welfare is at most 2/
√
m
We now prove the following lemma regarding the
support of the AND player.
Lemma 6.2 In any Nash equilibrium the AND
player does not have in its support any bid vector
band such that
∑m
i=1 band,i > 1.
Proof: Assume that there is such a bid vector band.
Since
∑m
i=1 band,i > 1 the AND player can not get
a positive utility, and the only way it can gain a
zero utility is by losing all its non-zero bids. This
implies that for any bid vector bor of the OR player,
the OR player will win all the items. Therefore∑m
i=1 bor,i > 1. This implies that the revenue of the
auctioneer is larger than 1 (every time). Since the
expected revenue of the auctioneer is larger than 1,
and the optimal social welfare is 1, the sum of the
expected utilities of the players has to be negative.
Hence one of the players has an expected negative
utility. This clearly can not occur in equilibrium.
It turns out that for this example, not only there
exist bad equilibria, but actually all equilibria are
bad!
Theorem 6.3 For any Nash equilibrium of the
AND-OR game with the parameters above the so-
cial welfare is at most 3
√
(logm)/m. I.e. the
PoS ≥√m/ logm/3.
Proof:Assume we have a Nash equilibrium in
which the AND player wins with probability α.
This implies that the expected utility of the OR
player uor is at most (1 − α)v. Also, the social
welfare of the equilibrium is (1− α)v + α ≤ v + α.
By Lemma 6.2 the AND player never plays a bid
b in which the sum of the bids is larger than 1. This
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implies that the AND player can have at most half
of the bids which are larger than 2/m. Therefore,
if the OR player bid 2/m on logm random items, it
will win some item with probability at least 1−1/m.
The OR player utility from such a strategy is at
least (1− 1/m)v− (logm)/m. This implies that in
equilibrium,
(1− α)v ≥ uor ≥ (1− 1/m)v − (logm)/m.
For v =
√
(logm)/m it implies that α ≤
2
√
(logm)/m. Therefore the social welfare is at
most 3
√
(logm)/m.
Finally we study examples in which there are
multiple equilibria, and show that they can be far
apart from one another:
Theorem 6.4 There is a set of valuations such
that in the corresponding simultaneous first price
auction there is an efficient (pure) Nash equilib-
rium, as well as an inefficient one, where the in-
efficiency is at least by a factor of
√
m/2. Equiva-
lently, the corresponding auction has PoS = 1 but
PoA ≥ √m/2.
Proof: Consider m = ℓ2 items, which are labeled
by (i, j) for i, j ∈ [1, ℓ]. Now we analyze 2ℓ single
minded bidder, where for each i ∈ [1, ℓ] we have
a bidder that wants all the items in (i, ∗), we call
those bidders row bidders. For each j ∈ [1, ℓ] we
have a bidder that want (∗, j), and we call them
column bidders. All bidders have value ℓ for their
set. Note that there is no allocation where both
a row and a column players are satisfied, where a
player is satisfied if it is allocated all the items in
his set. The social optimum value is ℓ2 (satisfying
all the row bidders or all the column bidders). In
this game there is a Walresian equilibrium, where
the price of each item is 1. Similarly, there is a pure
Nash equilibrium where all bidders bid 1 for each
item and we break the ties in favor to all the row
players (or alternatively, to all the column play-
ers). This implies that the PoS is 1. Note that this
game has also a mixed Nash equilibrium (Section
5.2, Theorem 5.5). Since it is a symmetric equi-
librium, in which every player bids the same value
on all items, the expected number of satisfied play-
ers is at most 2 (since the probability of k satisfied
players is at most 2−k). This implies that the PoA
is ℓ/2 =
√
m/2.
7 Approximate Welfare Anal-
ysis
In this section we analyze the Price of Anarchy of
the simultaneous first-price auction. We start with
a simple proof of an O(m) upper bound on the
price of anarchy for general valuations. Then we
consider β-XOS valuations (which are equivalent
to β-fractionally subadditive valuations) and prove
an upper bound of 2β. Since subadditive valuations
are O(logm) fractionally subadditive [5, 2] we also
get an upper bound of O(logm) on the price of
anarchy for subadditive valuations.
Assume that in OPT player i gets set Oi and
receives value oi = vi(Oi). Let ki be |Oi|. Let ei
be the expected value player i gets in an equilib-
rium and let ui be the expected utility of player i
in an equilibrium. Let ri be the expected sum of
payments in equilibrium over all items in Oi (these
are not necessarily won by player i in equilibrium).
Denote the total welfare, revenue, and utility in
equilibrium by SW (eq), REV (eq), and U(eq), re-
spectively. By definitions we have: (1) SW (eq) =∑
i ei, (2) SW (OPT ) =
∑
i oi, (3) REV (eq) =∑
i ri ≤ SW (eq), (4) U(eq) =
∑
i ui = SW (eq) −
REV (eq).
Theorem 7.1 For any set of buyers the PoA is at
most 4m.
Proof: We first show that for each buyer i, we have
2ui ≥ oi − 4kiri.
By Markov, with probability of at least 1/2 the
total sum of prices of items in Oi is at most 2ri.
Thus if player i bids 2ri for each item in Oi (and 0
elsewhere) he wins all items with probability of at
least 1/2, getting expected value of at least oi/2,
and paying at most 2kiri. Since we were in equi-
librium this utility must be at most ui. Hence,
2ui ≥ oi − 4kiri.
Summing over all buyers, and bounding
∑
i ki ≤
m, we get that OPT ≤ 2U(eq) + 4mRev(eq) ≤
4mSW (eq).
A function v is β-XOS, if there exists an XOS
function X such that for any set S we have v(S) ≥
X(S) ≥ v(S)/β, i.e., if there are numbers λj,l, j ∈
M and l ∈ L, such that for any set S we have
v(S) ≥ max
k∈L
∑
j∈S
λj,k ≥ v(S)/β
11
The equivalence of β-XOS and β fractionally sub-
additive follows the same proof as in [5].
Theorem 7.2 Assume that the valuations of all
the players are β-XOS. Then the PoA is 2β.
Proof: Since v is β-XOS, there is a k ∈ L such
that
∑
j∈Oi
λj,k ≥ vi(Oi)/β, and for any set S, we
have v(S) ≥ ∑j∈S λj,k. Let fj be the expected
price of item j. By Markov inequality, with proba-
bility of at least 1/2 the price of item j is at most
2fj. Consider the deviation where player i bids
bidi,j = min{λj,k, 2fj} for each item j ∈ Oi (and 0
elsewhere). Player i wins each item j with probabil-
ity αj and if bidi,j = 2fj then αj ≥ 1/2. Let Si be
the set of item that player i wins with his deviation
bids bidi,j. (Note that Si is a random variable that
depends on the random bids of the other players.)
The expected utility of player i from the deviation
is,
E[vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
bidi,j] ≥
∑
j∈Oi
αj(λj,k − bidi,j)
≥
∑
j∈Oi
1
2
(λj,k − bidi,j)
≥
∑
j∈Oi
1
2
(λj,k − 2fj)
≥ 1
2β
vi(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi
fj .
Since player i was playing an equilibrium strat-
egy, we have that ui ≥ E[vi(Si) −
∑
j∈Si
bidi,j ].
Summing over all players i’s, and recalling that
REV (eq) =
∑
j∈M fj , we get,
E[SW (eq)]−REV (eq) =
n∑
i=1
ui
≥ 1
2β
E[SW (OPT )]−REV (eq),
which completes the proof.
8 Bayesian Price of Anarchy
In a Bayesian setting there is a known prior distri-
butionQ over the valuations of the players. We first
sample v ∼ Q and inform each player i his valua-
tion vi. Following that, each player i draws his bid
from the distribution Di(vi), i.e., given a valuation
vi he bids (bi,1, . . . , bi,m) ∼ Di(vi). The distribu-
tions D(v) = (D1(v1), . . . , Dn(vn)) are a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if each Di(vi) is a best response
of player i, given that its valuation is vi and the
valuations are drawn from Q.
We start with the general case, where the dis-
tribution over valuations is arbitrary and the valu-
ations are also arbitrary. Later we study product
distributions over β-XOS valuations.
Theorem 8.1 For any prior distribution Q over
the players valuations, the Bayesian PoA is at most
4mn+ 2.
Proof: Fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium D =
(D1, . . . , Dn) as described above. Let Qvi be the
distribution on v−i obtained by conditioning Q on
vi as the value of player i.
Let ui(vi) be the expected utility of player
i when his valuation is vi, i.e., ui(vi) =
Ebi∼Di(vi)Ev−i∼QviEb−i∼D−i [vi(Si) −
∑
j∈Si
bi,j],
where Si is the set of items that player i wins with
the set of bids b. Let ui be the expected utility of
player i, i.e., Evi∼Q[ui(vi)].
For any valuation vi for player i, consider the
following deviation. Let Rev(vi) be the expected
revenue given that the valuation of player i is vi,
i.e., Rev(vi) = Ev∼Qvi [
∑m
j=1 maxk bk,j ]. Consider
the deviation where player i bids 2Rev(vi) on each
item j ∈M . By Markov inequality, he will win all
the items M with probability at least 1/2. There-
fore, his utility from the deviation is at least
vi(M)/2− 2mRev(vi)
Since this is an equilibrium, we have that
ui(vi) ≥ vi(M)/2− 2mRev(vi)
Summing over the players and taking the expecta-
tion with respect to v,
n∑
i=1
Ev[ui(vi)] ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev[vi(M)/2− 2mRev(vi)]
Clearly
∑n
i=1 Ev[ui(vi)] ≤ Ev(SW (D)), where
Ev(SW (D)) is the expected social welfare of the
Bayesian equilibrium D. Also,
∑n
i=1 Ev[vi(M)] ≥
Ev[SW (OPT (v))]. Finally, for every player i,
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Ev[Rev(vi)] = Rev, where Rev is the expected rev-
enue. Therefore,
Ev[SW (D)] ≥ Ev[SW (OPT (v))]/2− 2mnRev
Since Rev ≤ Ev[SW (D)], we have that,
(4mn+ 2)Ev[SW (D)] ≥ Ev[SW (OPT (v))]
The following theorem show that the Bayesian
PoA is at most 4β when the valuations are limited
to β-XOS and the distribution Q over valuations
is a product distribution. The proof uses the ideas
presented in [2].
Theorem 8.2 For a product distribution Q over
β-XOS valuations of the players, the Bayesian PoA
is at most 4β.
Proof: Fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium D =
(D1, . . . , Dn) as described above. Let Qvi be the
distribution on v−i obtained by conditioning Q on
vi as the value of player i.
Consider the following deviation of player i, given
its valuation vi. Player i draws w−i ∼ Qvi , that
is w−i are random valuations of the other players,
conditioned on player i having valuation vi. Player
i computes the optimal allocation OPT (vi, w−i),
and in particular his share OPTi(vi, w−i) in that
allocation. Player i bids 2fj(vi) on each item
j ∈ OPTi(vi, w−i) , where fj(vi) is the expected
maximum bid of the other players on item j in the
equilibrium D conditioned on player i having valu-
ation vi, i.e.,
fj(vi) = Ew−i∼QviEb−i∼D−i(w−i)[maxk 6=i
bk,j ] .
By Markov inequality player i wins each item j ∈
OPTi(vi, w−i) with probability at least half. Since
vi is an β-XOS valuation, its expected value is at
least vi(OPTi(vi, w−i))/(2β) so the utility of player
i in this deviation is at least
Ew−i∼Qvi [vi(OPTi(vi, w−i))/(2β)−
∑
j∈OPTi(vi,w−i)
2fj(vi)]
Let ui(vi) be the expected utility of player
i when his valuation is vi, i.e., ui(vi) =
Ebi∼Di(vi)Ev−i∼QviEb−i∼D−i [vi(Si) −
∑
j∈Si
bi,j ],
where Si is the set of items that player i wins with
the set of bids b. Let ui be the expected utility of
player i, i.e., Evi∼Q[ui(vi)]. We get that,
ui(vi) ≥
Ew−i∼Qvi [vi(OPTi(vi, w−i))/(2β)−
∑
j∈OPTi(vi,w−i)
2fj(vi)]
Takin the expectation with respect to vi,
ui = Evi [ui(vi)]
≥ EviEw−i∼Qvi [vi(OPTi(vi, w−i))/(2β)
−
∑
j∈OPTi(vi,w−i)
2fj(vi)]
= Ev∼Q[vi(OPTi(v))/(2β)]
−Ev∼Q[
∑
j∈OPTi(v)
2fj(vi)]
= Ev∼Q[vi(OPTi(v))/(2β)]
−2Ev∼Q[
∑
j∈M
I(j ∈ OPTi(v))fj(vi)],
where I(X) is the indicator function for the event
X . Summing over all the players
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev∼Q[vi(OPTi(v))/(2β)]
−2
n∑
i=1
Ev∼Q[
∑
j∈M
I(j ∈ OPTi(v))fj(vi)]
= Ev∼Q[SW (OPT (v))/(2β)]
−2
∑
j∈M
Ev∼Q[
n∑
i=1
I(j ∈ OPTi(v))fj(vi)]
Now we use the fact that the distribution Q over
the valuations is a product distribution. This im-
plies that for any valuation vi, we have the same
value fj(vi). Let price(j) be the expected price of
item j ∈M , i.e., price(j) = Ev∼QEb∼D[ maxk bk,j ].
Since price(j) ≥ fj(vi) for any buyer i and valua-
tion vi,
n∑
i=1
ui ≥ Ev∼Q[SW (OPT (v))/(2β)]
−2
∑
j∈M
price(j)Ev∼Q[
n∑
i=1
I(j ∈ OPTi(v))]
= Ev∼Q[SW (OPT (v))/(2β)]− 2
∑
j∈M
price(j),
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where the last equality follows since item j is always
assigned to some buyer, therefore, for any v, we
have
∑n
i=1 I(j ∈ OPTi(v)) = 1.
Let sw(D) be the expected social welfare of the
Bayesian Nash D. Note that
∑n
i=1 ui = sw(D) −∑
j∈M price(j). Therefore,
sw(D)−
∑
j∈M
price(j) ≥
Ev∼Q[SW (OPT (v))/(2β)]− 2
∑
j∈M
price(j),
which implies that
2sw(D) ≥ sw(D) +
∑
j∈M
price(j) ≥ Ev∼Q[SW (OPT (v))/(2β)].
This implies that the PoA of the Bayesian equilib-
rium D is at most 4β.
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